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1 
The Global Transgender Population and the 
International Criminal Court  
Brian Kritz1 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Recognition of the rights of lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) persons 
has received considerable global attention in recent years.  A landmark 
United Nations Resolution on human rights, sexual orientation and gender 
identity in June 2011,2 a major policy address in December 2011 by then-
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton,3 the 2013 Inaugural Address of President 
Barack Obama,4 a progressive court ruling in Colombia,5 and a reversal of 
discriminatory national legislation in Malawi6 all bode well for the contin-
                                                
1. Brian Kritz is a Research Fellow in the M.A. in Conflict Resolution Program at Georgetown 
University, where he also teaches in the Department of Government.  Previously, he was a 
Democracy Fellow in The Center of Excellence on Democracy, Human Rights and Governance 
at the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and a Senior Fellow in 
the M.A. Program in Law, Science and Global Security at Georgetown University.  Formerly, 
he was a pro bono legal advisor to the Prosecutor General for the Republic of Rwanda and a 
criminal prosecutor in California. Many thanks to Sandy James and Sarah Hager for their ex-
cellent assistance in researching this piece. 
2. Human Rights Council Res. 17/19, Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, 
17th Sess. (July 14, 2011), available at http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G11/148/76/PDF/ G1114876.pdf?OpenElement. 
3. Hillary Rodham Clinton, Sec’y of State, Remarks in Recognition of International Human 
Rights Day (Dec. 6, 2011), available at 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/12/178368.htm. 
4. President Barack Obama, Second Inaugural Address (Jan. 21, 2013), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/01/21/inaugural-address-president-
barack-obama (“Our journey is not complete until our gay brothers and sisters are treated like 
anyone else under the law . . . .”).  
5. See CNN Wire Staff, Colombian Court Says Congress Must Decide on Gay Marriage, CNN 
WORLD, July 27, 2011, 
http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/americas/07/27/colombia.gay.marriage/index.html. 
The Constitutional Court of Colombia ruled that “gay couples in de facto unions constitute a 
family” and gave the Congress two years to create legislation addressing same-sex marriages.  
Colombian Constitutional Court Decision C-029 of 2009 (Jan. 28, 2009), available at 
http://english.corteconstitucional.gov.co/sentences/C-029-2009.pdf. 
6. See Godfrey Mapondera & David Smith, Malawi Suspends Anti-Gay Laws as MPs Debate Re-
peal, GUARDIAN, Nov. 5, 2012, available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/nov/05/malawi-gay-laws-debate-repeal. In No-
vember of 2012, President Joyce Banda of Malawi announced a moratorium on sections 153 
and 156 of the national penal code, which criminalizes sexual conduct between men and sec-
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ued expansion of the protection and promotion of the global LGB commu-
nity. 
While the global transgender community receives frequent mention as 
the “T” under the umbrella of so-called LGBT rights, the international call 
for increased prevention of rights abuses against transgender persons, 
promotion of transgender rights, and protection of transgender communi-
ties pales in comparison to the similar call for the global LGB population.  
A conspicuous example of this divergence between LGB rights and 
transgender rights is Secretary of State Clinton’s December 2011 address on 
human rights.  While Secretary Clinton mentioned the rights of LGBT per-
sons at many points in her speech commemorating International Human 
Rights Day, she never spoke of the rights of transgender persons as a stand-
alone, always linking transgender persons to a discussion of one or more of 
the LGB group.7  In comparison, she mentioned gay persons and issues 
alone on over fifteen occasions.8  In the arguably seminal moment in her 
speech, she stated that “gay rights are human rights, and human rights are 
gay rights,” leaving transgender persons conspicuously absent.9   While 
working for the United States Agency for International Development as a 
Democracy Fellow and Senior Rule of Law and Human Rights Advisor in 
December 2011, I heard from colleagues that an initial draft of this sentence 
included “transgender,” but “transgender” was stricken from the final draft 
of the speech, leaving transgender rights outside of the “most tweetable” 
moment of her speech.  As illustrated by this example, the sheer volume of 
publically available discourse on sexual identity rights lags well behind the 
dialogue on LGB rights.   
Yet transgender persons are, like LGB persons, the victims of consider-
able violence, discrimination, and persecution in many countries across the 
globe.  As just one example of crimes against transgender persons, in March 
2012, up to seventy young Iraqi males who identified as “emo” were mur-
dered in and around Baghdad, due to their decision to wear tight-fitting, 
androgynous, and effete clothing, nose rings, studded leather belts and 
bracelets, and dyed hair, and due to their presumed links to effeminacy and 
homosexuality. Ali Hili, a gay Iraqi activist based in London, called the kill-
ings “a clear war on sexual minorities on Iraq.”10  Similarly, transgender 
                                                                                                             
tion 137A, which criminalizes “indecent practices between females,” until Parliament decides 
the issue. Id.   
7. Clinton Remarks, supra note 3.  An example of the linking of transgender persons with les-
bian, gay and bisexual individuals is Secretary Clinton’s statement that “I am talking about 
gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender people, human beings born free and given bestowed 
equality and dignity, who have a right to claim that, which is now one of the remaining hu-
man rights challenges of our time.”  Another such example is “Many LGBT Americans have 
endured violence and harassment in their own lives, and for some, including many young 
people, bullying and exclusion are daily experiences. So we, like all nations, have more work 
to do to protect human rights at home.” 
8. Id. 
9. Id. 
10. Jack Healy, Threats and Killings Striking Fear Among Young Iraqis, Including Gays, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 11, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/12/world/middleeast/killings-
strike-fear-in-iraqi-gay-and-emo-youth.html. 
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persons in Latin America, Russia, and dozens of other countries suffer from 
endemic hostility, persecution, and mass violence.11  A macro look at the 
numbers of transgender persons murdered in recent years is even more so-
bering.  The March 2013 update of the Trans Murder Monitoring Project 
finds 1,123 reported killings of trans people in fifty-seven countries world-
wide from January 1, 2008 to December 31, 2012.12  The update also shows a 
significant rise in reported killings of trans people over the last five years.13  
“In 2008, 148 cases were reported, in 2009, 217 cases, in 2010, 229 cases, in 
2011, 262 cases, and in 2012, 267 cases.”14 
Throughout the latter half of the 20th century and the first decade and a 
half of the 21st century, commonly dubbed “the age of human rights” by le-
gal scholars, international criminal law has been at the vanguard in expand-
ing legal protections for vulnerable populations, both attempting to protect 
those in need of protection and punishing those malefactors who have vio-
lated the basic rights of others.15  Whether it be the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
Trials after World War II, the Eichmann Trial in Israel in 1961, the cases 
arising in the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) or the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in the 
1990s, law has provided a so-called “engine for justice” for those previously 
victimized, each successive case reaching farther than its predecessors to 
protect more persons and more groups from international mass atrocity 
crimes.  
With the force of almost seventy years of “the age of human rights” as 
an accelerant, one would hope that international criminal law would pro-
vide the global transgender and intersex communities with the type of basic 
protection needed by such vulnerable populations.  However, international 
criminal law fails mightily to provide such relief.  While international 
criminal law, as represented by protective aegis of the permanent Interna-
tional Criminal Court (ICC), declares its intention to “guarantee lasting re-
                                                
11. For an excellent discussion of violence against Pakistan’s transgender community, see 
Mashal Shah, The Kwaja Seras: Pakistan’s Endangered Minority, HUFFINGTON POST, Aug. 13, 2013, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mashal-shah/pakistans-endangered-spec_b_3732591.html.  
For a comprehensive report on violence against transgender women in Latin America, see 
INTERNATIONAL HIV/AIDS ALLIANCE, THE NIGHT IS ANOTHER COUNTRY: IMPUNITY AND 
VIOLENCE AGAINST TRANSGENDER WOMEN HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS IN LATIN AMERICA 
(2012), available at http://issuu.com/aids_alliance/docs/thenightisanothercountry. 
12. Constant Rise in Murder Rates: Transgender Europe’s Trans Murder Monitoring Project Reveals 
More Than 1,100 Reported Murders of Trans People in the Last Five Years, TRANSRESPECT VERSUS 




15. An accessible yet broad definition of what constitutes a vulnerable population is captured 
in Chapter 5 of Understanding Human Rights: An Exercise Book, by Elisabeth Reichert.  Professor 
Reichert writes that “[i]n a human rights sense, certain population groups often encounter dis-
criminatory treatment or need special attention to avoid potential exploitation. These popula-
tions make up what can be referred to as vulnerable groups.”  ELISABETH REICHERT, 
UNDERSTANDING HUMAN RIGHTS: AN EXERCISE BOOK (2006), at 78, available at 
http://www.sagepub.com/upm-data/11973_Chapter_5.pdf.  Other often-cited examples of 
vulnerable groups include women, children, ethnic, racial, and religious minorities, among 
others. 
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spect for and the enforcement of international justice,” and to protect men, 
women, and children from mass atrocity, it fails to live up to its declared 
ideals.16  The ICC cannot pursue a case of genocide in the event of a tar-
geted17 mass atrocity against transgender and intersex persons and may not 
even be able to protect transgender and intersex persons from crimes 
against humanity in the case of such a targeted18 attack, based on a conflu-
ence of the prevalence of transgenderism and intersexuality and the vaga-
ries of “crimes against humanity law.”  This article concludes that the State 
Parties to the Rome Statute of the ICC have effectively left transgender and 
intersex persons unprotected in the case of a targeted attack against their 
numbers, effectively giving perpetrators of targeted violence against such 
groups a sense of impunity that their actions cannot be addressed by inter-
national criminal law. 
This article proceeds in eight Parts.  Part II begins with a discussion of 
what is meant by the term “transgender,” both within and outside the dis-
cipline of law.  This section includes the ongoing definitional debate over 
the term “transgender” and the scope of those considered to be trans-
gender, establishing a working definition for purposes of the legal analysis 
set forth in Parts IV-VII of this article.  Similarly, Part II will define and dis-
cuss the term “intersex.”   
Part III addresses the available demographics of the global transgender 
and intersex communities, while also discussing the challenges of identify-
ing the scope of the communities, writ large, both in the developed and de-
veloping world.  Examining the demographics of the transgender and in-
tersex communities is necessary to understand exactly how many 
transgender persons are in danger of suffering violence worldwide, and to 
address a number of questions as to whether these global communities can 
be properly protected from crimes against humanity. 
Part IV introduces the issue of the scope of jurisdiction of the Rome 
Statute, and its potential application to address violence against trans-
gender and intersex populations.   
Part V discusses whether transgender and/or intersex persons can 
benefit from the protections of the genocide provisions of Article 6 of the 
Rome Statute.  Through an examination of the Rome Statute and its legal 
forefather, the 1948 Convention for the Prevention of the Crime of Geno-
cide, the travaux préparatoires of both instruments, and the rulings of the In-
                                                
16. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (“Rome Statute”) preamble, opened 
for signature July 17, 1998, available at http://legal.un.org/icc/statute/99_corr/cstatute.htm. 
17. I place a hearty emphasis that I am writing about a targeted mass atrocity against a trans-
gender population, not a more widespread societal or national conflagration in which violence 
against transgender persons are a mere part.  If violence against a transgender population 
were merely one portion or piece of another Rwanda or former Yugoslavia, my legal analysis 
would be entirely different (such violence very might well qualify as a crime against humanity 
or war crime).  What I am writing about is targeted violence against transgender communities 
because they are transgender.    
18. Again, my legal analysis is based on the assumption of a targeted attack on a transgender 
community or communities, not an attack of wider scope that happens to include transgender 
persons.  In the case of a wider attack, in which attacks against transgender persons are a mere 
part, my legal analysis might look significantly different. 
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ternational Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the International Crimi-
nal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), and the ICC in the case of 
Prosecutor v. Bashir, it will be concluded that transgender and intersex per-
sons are not among the groups protected from genocide under Article 6. 
Part VI describes the unique predicament of the global transgender 
community with regard to protection from crimes against humanity under 
Article 7 of the Rome Statute.  Due to the unique and expansive definition 
of “transgender,” and the limited numbers of transgender persons, this ar-
ticle concludes that it would be difficult to satisfy the requirement for 
prosecution under Article 7—in other words, it is unlikely that there could 
be a widespread or systematic enough attack against a transgender civilian 
population to demonstrate the commission of crimes against humanity in 
the case of a targeted attack against their limited numbers.  Similarly, the 
even fewer numbers of intersex persons present quite a challenge for a 
prosecution under Article 7. 
Part VII highlights that Article 7 also may not protect transgender or in-
tersex populations from the crime of persecution.  For while it is a crime 
against humanity to persecute a group based on gender, “gender” is then 
defined as “the two sexes, male and female,” and the definition specifically 
excludes any other meaning.  Therefore, as many transgender persons iden-
tify neither as male or female—instead describing themselves as “agender,” 
“androgyne,” “polygender,” or “genderqueer”—they are arguably ex-
cluded from protection under Article 7.19   Similarly, intersex persons, who 
are born with chromosomes, hormones, genitalia, and/or other sex charac-
teristics that are not exclusively male or female, as defined by the medical 
establishment in society, are considered to be outside the binary 
male/female dyad seemingly required by Article 7, and are therefore po-
tentially left unprotected by its auspices.  
Part VIII is a discussion of the real-world implications of the global 
transgender and intersex communities having been left out of the protective 
and preventative sphere of the ICC, and a caution that international crimi-
nal law cannot live up to the principles set forth in the Preamble to the 




                                                
19. See SILVAN AGIUS & CHRISTA TOBLER, TRANS & INTERSEX PEOPLE: DISCRIMINATION ON THE 
GROUNDS OF SEX, GENDER IDENTITY AND GENDER EXPRESSION, EUROPEAN COMMISSION REPORT 
12-13 (2011), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/discrimination/files/trans_and_intersex_people_ web3_en.pdf 
(“The terms androgyne, polygender and genderqueer are very similar in their definition and refer 
to those people who, having a combination of masculine and feminine characteristics, are 
‘gender fluid’ and move between genders, and have blurred lines between their gender iden-
tity, gender expression and sexual orientation.  Agender people do not have a gender identity 
and refuse to be classified as male or female or in any other way.”). 
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II(A).  THE MEANING OF TRANSGENDER 
The meaning of the term “transgender” has been addressed by multiple 
disciplines and entities on both the international and national level, but no 
authoritative definition exists.  Therefore, this section discusses the term 
transgender as defined by various sources in the legal, psychological, 
health, advocacy, and international organizations fields.   Part II concludes 
by establishing a working definition of the term transgender for purposes 
of the rest of this article.  
 
Primary Legal Sources and the Meaning of “Transgender” 
The primary sources of international law—treaties and customary law 
enjoying consistent state practice and opinio juris—do not define the term 
“transgender.” In the absence of a comprehensive international legal defini-
tion, it seems prudent to explore available national court rulings and their 
attempts to define transgender to guide our understanding of the term.     
In the United States, law provides no uniform definition of “trans-
gender.”20  In fact, there are only two American cases that discuss the defi-
nition of the term with any degree of specificity and detail.  In Oiler v. 
Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc., Dr. Walter Bockting, Ph.D., an expert in the field 
of transgender issues, defined transgender as an umbrella term to describe 
those who cross or do not adhere to culturally defined gender categories.21  
Under the aforementioned umbrella, Dr. Bockting included male-to-female 
and female-to-male transsexuals, transgenderists, bigender persons, drag 
queens and drag kings, and female and male impersonators.22  Dr. Bockting 
defined cross-dressers or transvestites as those “who desire to wear cloth-
ing associated with another sex,” male-to-female and female-to-male trans-
sexuals as those “who pursue or have undergone hormone therapy or sex 
reassignment surgery,” transgenderists as those “who live in the gender 
role associated with another sex without desiring sex reassignment sur-
gery,” bigender persons as those “who identify as both man and woman,” 
drag queens and kings as “usually gay men and lesbian women who do 
‘drag’ and dress up in, respectively, women’s and men’s clothes,” and fe-
male and male impersonators as “males who impersonate women and fe-
males who impersonate men, usually for entertainment.”23 
Similarly, in Schroer v. Billington, Dr. Bockting testified as an expert 
witness on behalf of plaintiff Diane Schroer, a male to female transsexual 
who was offered a job at the Library of Congress, and after self-disclosure 
that she was a transgender person, found the offer of employment re-
                                                
20. See Judy Bennett Garner & Sandy James eds., Employment Discrimination Against LGBTQ 
Persons, 14 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 363, 365 (2013). 
21. Oiler v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc., No. Civ. A. 00-3114, 2002 WL 31098541, at *1 n.9 (E.D. 
La. Sept. 16, 2002). 
22. Id.  
23. Id. 
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voked.24  Dr. Bockting’s definition of transgender in this case was quite 
similar to his definition given in Oiler. The definition in Schroer, as summa-
rized by District Judge James Robertson, was “that a person's sex is a multi-
faceted concept that incorporates a number of factors, including sex as-
signed at birth, hormonal sex, internal and external morphological sex, 
hypothalamic sex, and gender identity.”25 
Similarly, there exists a paucity of case law regarding the definition of 
transgender in European law.  In a discussion of the interrelation of Euro-
pean Community law and the European Convention on Human Rights, the 
seminal case of P. v. S., while discussing “transsexualism” in particular, 
provided an incredibly broad and inclusive definition that also may be use-
ful in our discussion of transgender: “that biological sex and sexual identity 
fail to coincide.”26    
African, Asian, Middle Eastern and South American courts have not 
provided any definitions of “transgender.”  With the lack of more than a 
small handful of court cases, worldwide, that discuss the term “trans-
gender,” it seems wise to examine secondary legal sources and disciplines 
outside of law that have had the opportunity to explore the term in greater 
detail. 
 
Secondary Legal Sources on the Meaning of Transgender 
Perhaps in an effort to fill the gap created by the dearth of court rulings 
on the issue, there have been a number of law journal articles on the defini-
tion and scope of the term transgender, which echo the definitions set forth 
in Oiler v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc and P. v. S..  Ilona M. Turner used 
transgender to describe an inclusive group composed of “transsexuals, 
cross-dressers and anyone else whose gender identity or expression is sig-
nificantly non-traditional.”27  Navah C. Spero included within the term 
anyone who does not conform to gender norms set forth by society, includ-
ing transsexuals, transvestites, and people who identify as genderqueer, 
while also stating that the “term has expanded to include anyone who does 
not identify as either male or female in our society’s binary view of gender, 
including those that identify as part of a gender continuum.”28  
In a lengthy European Commission Report on transgender persons in 
Europe, authors Silvan Agius and Christa Tobler provided a decidedly 
comprehensive definition.29  Agius and Tobler defined transgender as in-
                                                
24. Schroer v. Billington, 525 F. Supp. 2d 58 (D.D.C. 2007). 
25. Id. at 61. 
26. Case C-13/94, P. v. S. and Cornwall Cnty. Council, Op. of Advocate Gen. Tesauro, 1995 
E.C.R., I-2148, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX: 
61994CC0013:EN:PDF. 
27. Ilona M. Turner, Sex Stereotyping Per Se: Transgender Employees and Title VII, 95 CALIF. L. 
REV. 561, 561 n.2 (2007). 
28. Navah C. Spero, Transgendered Plaintiffs in Title VII Suits: Why the Schroer v. Billington Ap-
proach Makes Sense, 9 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 387, 392-93 (2010). 
29. Agius and Tobler, supra note 19.  
7
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cluding those who identify as transsexual,30 transgender,31 transves-
tite/cross-dressing,32 androgyne, polygender, genderqueer,33 agender,34 
gender variant35 or persons with “any other gender identity and expression 
which is not standard male or female, and who express their gender 
through their choice of clothes, presentation or body modifications, includ-
ing the undergoing of multiple surgical procedures.”36   
 
The Meaning of Transgender in Health and Psychology 
Transgenderism as an intertwined issue of health and psychology has a 
long history.  Thus, it seems beneficial to explore in tandem the fields of 
health and psychology as potential sources of a comprehensive definition of 
the term “transgender.”  Reviewing the disciplines of health and psychol-
ogy provides definitions of transgender that are similar to that of the above 
legal sources.  The American Psychological Association (APA) uses trans-
gender as an “umbrella term for persons whose gender identity, gender ex-
pression, or behavior does not conform to that typically associated with the 
sex to which they were assigned at birth.”37  Health-based scholarship pro-
vides a similar definition, using transgender as an adjective describing “a 
diverse group of individuals who cross or transcend culturally defined 
categories of gender.”38 
                                                
30. “Transsexual people identify with the gender role opposite to the sex assigned to them at 
birth and seek to live permanently in the preferred gender role. This is often accompanied by 
strong rejection of their physical primary and secondary sex characteristics and a wish to align 
their body with their preferred gender. Transsexual people might intend to undergo, be un-
dergoing or have undergone gender reassignment treatment (which may or may not involve 
hormone therapy or surgery).” Id. at 12. 
31. “Transgender people live permanently in their preferred gender. Unlike transsexuals, how-
ever, they may not necessarily wish to or need to undergo any medical interventions.” Id. 
32. “Transvestite/Cross dressing people enjoy wearing the clothing of another gender for certain 
periods of time. Their sense of identification with another gender can range from being very 
strong and indeed it being their primary gender, to being a less critical part of their identity. 
Some transvestite or cross-dressing people may seek medical assistance to transition and live 
permanently in their preferred gender at some point in their lives. Others are happy to con-
tinue cross dressing part-time for the rest of their lives.” Id. 
33. “The terms androgyne, polygender and genderqueer are very similar in their definition and 
refer to those people who, having a combination of masculine and feminine characteristics, are 
‘gender fluid’ and move between genders, and have blurred lines between their gender iden-
tity, gender expression and sexual orientation.” Id. 
34. “Agender people do not have a gender identity and refuse to be classified as male or female 
or in any other way.” Id. 
35. “Gender variant refers to anyone whose gender varies from normative gender identity and 
the roles of the gender assigned at birth.” Id. 
36. Id.  
37. AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N, ANSWERS TO YOUR QUESTIONS ABOUT TRANSGENDER PEOPLE, GENDER 
IDENTITY, AND GENDER EXPRESSION 1 (2011), available at 
http://www.apa.org/topics/sexuality/transgender.pdf. According to the APA, “[g]ender 
identity refers to a person’s internal sense of being male, female, or something else; gender ex-
pression refers to the way a person communicates gender identity to others through behavior, 
clothing, hairstyles, voice, or body characteristics.” Id. 
38. E. Coleman et al., Standards of Care for the Health of Transexual, Transgender, and Gender-
8
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The Advocacy Community and the Meaning of Transgender 
It seems incomplete to only discuss how different professional groups, 
groups decidedly not transgender in nature, define the term “transgender.”  
The powerful concept of self-identity demonstrated in the transgender 
community’s effort to define itself seems vital to a full exploration of the 
meaning of “being transgender.”  This perspective of self-identity is also 
relevant for Part V, because self-identification as a group is an important 
issue for purposes of international criminal legal protection regarding the 
crime of genocide. 
Worldwide, there many advocacy and support groups for transgender 
persons, their families and loved ones.  Selecting a pair of advocacy organi-
zations to represent the self-definition of transgender was an exercise in 
caution.  After the advice and counsel of numerous transgender advocates, 
I selected Global Action for Trans* Equality (GATE) and the National Cen-
ter for Transgender Equality (NCTE) as the two examples of how the trans-
gender community defines itself, because both organizations enjoy wide ac-
ceptance and respect within the transgender community and also 
represented a considerable level of inclusivity in their definitions of who is 
deemed to be represented under the “transgender” umbrella term. 
Global Action for Trans* Equality uses the term “trans” to describe 
those who transgress binary western gender norms, and includes those 
who identify with a gender different from the one assigned to them at birth 
and those who present themselves differently to the expectations of the 
gender role assigned to them at birth, by means of clothing, accessories, 
cosmetics, or body modification.39  In their open-ended definition of those 
fitting into the “trans” term, GATE includes transsexual and transgender 
people, transvestites, travesti, cross-dressers, no gender and genderqueer 
people.40 
The National Center for Transgender Equality provides a similar de-
scription,41 using transgender as an “umbrella term for those whose gender 
identity, expression, or behavior is different from those typically associated 
with their assigned sex at birth, including, but not limited to, transsexuals,42 
                                                                                                             
Nonconforming People, Version 7, 13 INT’L J. OF TRANSGENDERISM 165, 222 (2011). 
39. GATE-GLOBAL ACTION FOR TRANS* EQUALITY, http://transactivists.org/trans/ (last visited 
June 8, 2013).  
40. Id.  Travesti are persons who were assigned as male at birth but have a feminine gender 






41. Transgender Terminology, NATIONAL CENTER FOR TRANSGENDER EQUALITY, 
http://transequality.org/Resources/NCTE_TransTerminology.pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2014). 
42. A term for people whose gender identity is different from their assigned sex at birth. Often 
transsexual people alter or wish to alter their bodies through hormones or surgery in order to 
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cross-dressers,43 androgynous people, genderqueers,44 and gender non-
conforming people.”45  
 
II(B). THE MEANING OF INTERSEX 
Many consider intersex persons as fitting under the transgender um-
brella term, as a group of persons who identify with a gender different from 
the one assigned to them at birth.46 Others opine, however, that intersex 
persons should be considered a distinct category from transgender persons, 
in that their status is not gender-related, but instead relates to their biologi-
cal makeup, which is neither entirely male nor female.47  Due to the lack of 
consensus, it seems prudent to dedicate a separate section for a discussion 
of the global intersex community, before melding together the legal discus-
sion of international criminal protections for transgender and intersex per-
sons for the balance of this article. 
Once described as “hermaphrodites,” intersex people are born with 
visible sexual anatomy that combines both male and female physical char-
acteristics,48 and/or possess chromosomes and manifest hormonal changes 
(often at puberty) or other sex characteristics usually associated with the 
opposite sex than the one assigned to them at birth.49 
Accordingly, the biological makeup of intersex people “is neither exclu-
sively male nor exclusively female, but is typical of both at once or not 
clearly defined as either.  These features can manifest themselves in secon-
dary sexual characteristics such as muscle mass, hair distribution, breasts 
and stature; in primary sexual characteristics such as reproductive organs 
                                                                                                             
make it match their gender identity. Id.   
43. “A term for people who dress in clothing traditionally or stereotypically worn by the other 
sex, but who generally have no intent to live full-time as the other gender.” Id. 
44. Genderqueer, as used by the NCTE, is “[a] term used by some individuals who identify as 
neither entirely male nor entirely female.” Id.   
45. Id. (“a term for individuals whose gender expression is different from societal expectations 
related to gender”) 
46. Taylor Flynn, Transforming the Debate: Why We Need to Include Transgender Rights in the 
Struggles for Sex and Sexual Orientation Equality, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 392, 393 n.5 (2001) (citing 
JAMISON GREEN, introduction to PAISLEY CURRAH & SHANNON MINTER, TRANSGENDER 
EQUALITY: A HANDBOOK FOR ACTIVISTS & POLICYMAKERS 1, 3-4 (2000), available at 
http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/ reports/TransgenderEquality.pdf).  
47. See AGIUS & TOBLER, supra note 19, at 12. 
48. See A Word About Words…, GENDER SPECTRUM, 
https://www.genderspectrum.org/images/stories/Resources/Family/A_Word_About_Wor
ds.pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2014). At birth, most intersex people are assigned a gender by the 
attending medical professional or by the parents.  This assignment may or may not be an accu-
rate selection, based on physical characteristics displayed later in life. Id.  
49. See DiMarco v. Wyo. Dep’t of Corr., 300 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1186 (D. Wyo. 2004), rev’d sub 
nom, Estate of DiMarco v. Wyo. Dep’t of Corr., Div. of Prisons, 473 F.3d 1334 (10th Cir. 
2007)(“[A] person is intersexual if they have both male and female characteristics, including in 
varying degrees reproductive organs, secondary sexual characteristics, and sexual behavior. 
This condition is the result of an abnormality of the sex chromosomes or a hormonal imbal-
ance during the development of the embryo.”).  
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and genitalia; and/or in chromosomal structures and hormones.”50  These 
characteristics can appear in a combination that demonstrates the unique 
biological makeup of the intersex person, i.e., facial hair indicative of a male 
and developed breast tissue more indicative of a female, or in any series of 
combinations.   
 
II(C).  A WORKING DEFINITION OF TRANSGENDER 
With the twin goals of inclusivity and specificity in mind, this article 
adopts the definition of transgender set forth by Agius and Tobler in Trans 
and Intersex People: Discrimination on the Grounds of Sex, Gender Identity, and 
Gender Expression—the most inclusive and detailed of the definitions, which 
thus lends itself to better legal analysis.51  Agius and Tobler’s definition of 
“transgender” includes people who identify as transsexual, transgender, 
transvestite and cross-dressing, androgyne, polygender, genderqueer, 
agender, gender variant or have any other gender expression which is not 
standard male or female, and persons “who express their gender through 
their choice of clothes, presentation or body modifications, including the 
undergoing of multiple surgical procedures.”52   
As a point of clarification, it seems prudent to point out that within 
Agius and Tobler’s definition, the issue of gender identity, i.e., the sense of 
whether a person is male or female, is determined internally, and this gen-
der identity need not be outwardly expressed in any way, shape, or form.  
This contention is supported by Schroer v. Billington, where Schroer, al-
though born male, had “a female gender identity—an internal, psychologi-
cal sense of herself as a woman.”53  Thus, our working definition of trans-
gender includes all people who consider themselves to be transgender, 
whether or not they externally demonstrate their internal, psychological 
sense of a gender identity that does not coincide with the sex assigned to 
them at birth. 
Agius and Tobler consider intersex persons to be a separate and distinct 
group because their status is related to biological makeup and is not gen-
                                                
50. AGIUS & TOBLER, supra note 19, at 12. 
51. In selecting the definition set forth by Agius and Tobler, I also considered that a number of 
non-western societies have culturally specific articulations of transgender that differ from the 
male/female dyad considered mainstream in the western world.  Agius and Tobler’s inclusion 
in their definition of transgender of a catch-all category, namely “any other gender expression 
that is not standard male or female,” seems to address any concerns that a European Commu-
nity report would not properly consider such non-western gender notions captured in the no-
tions of Kathoey in Thailand, Hijras in South Asia, and Two-Spirit persons of indigenous 
North Americans, among others. 
52. AGIUS & TOBLER, supra note 19, at 12. 
53. Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 295 (D.D.C. 2008).  This internal diagnosis as suf-
ficient to establish one’s transgender nature is supported by Oiler v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc., 
where “[p]laintiff defines transgendered as meaning that his gender identity, i.e., his sense of 
whether he is a male or female, is not consistently male.” Oiler v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc., 
No. Civ. A. 00-3114, 2002 WL 31098541, at *1 n.9 (E.D. La. Sept. 16, 2002). 
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der-related.54 While this distinction is duly noted, for ease of reading, inter-
sex persons will be discussed as part of the discussion of transgender per-
sons whenever possible, and will only be discussed separately in the below 
discussion of demographics and in Article 7(h) when the issue of biological 
makeup versus gender status is a distinguishing factor in our legal analysis. 
 
III(A).  DEMOGRAPHICS OF TRANSGENDER PERSONS 
A discussion of the demographics of the transgender community is im-
portant not only as an examination of an understudied population but also 
for the discussion of Article 7 of the Rome Statute of the ICC and the re-
quirement that such violence must be “widespread and systematic” to qual-
ify as a crime against humanity.  For these dual purposes, we will explore, 
to the extent possible, the issue of demography as it pertains to transgender 
persons.  
Unfortunately, even within the allegedly more tolerant liberal democ-
ratic traditions of the United States and Western Europe, the demographics 
of the transgender community are difficult to capture.  Dr. Gary J. Gates at-
tributes this difficulty to a number of factors, including the debate over who 
is considered a member of the transgender community, challenges in sur-
vey methods, and potential respondents’ concerns about confidentiality, 
anonymity, and being exposed as a member of a vulnerable population.55  
With these caveats, Dr. Gates uses the 2007 and 2009 Massachusetts Behav-
ioral Risk Factor Surveillance Survey (which suggested that 0.5% of adults 
aged 18 through 64 identified as transgender) and the aggregated informa-
tion from 2003 California LGBT Tobacco Survey and the 2009 California 
Health Interview Survey (that implied that approximately 0.1% of adults in 
California are transgender), and estimates that 697,529 American adults 
identify as transgender.  This total equates to approximately 0.3% of the 
adult population in the United States.56  
While detailed estimates of the size of the European transgender com-
munity are also in short supply, some anecdotal information is available.  
For example, in the 2012 European Union Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Trans-
gender Survey conducted by the European Union Agency for Fundamental 
Rights, over 93,000 self-identified LGBT persons participated in an online 
                                                
54. AGIUS & TOBLER, supra note 19, at 12. 
55. GARY J. GATES, HOW MANY PEOPLE ARE LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDER? 2 
(2011), available at http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Gates-How-
Many-People-LGBT-Apr-2011.pdf. 
56. Id. at 5. It is with some caution that I cite Dr. Gates’s use of California and Massachusetts as 
the two examples in the above text.  The reputation of these two states are quite liberal in re-
gards to acceptance of human differences, generally, and thus more transgender people might 
decide to live in these more tolerant states, skewing any attempt of extrapolation of these 
numbers to estimate the size the national transgender population.  On the other hand, the 
more tolerant nature of California and Massachusetts might allow for more accurate de-
mographical information, in that transgender persons in these two states might feel that self-
identification as transgender is an action without potential repercussion, thus allowing for a 
more accurate assessment of the size of transgender community. 
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survey.57  Of the 93,079 respondents, 6,771 identified as transgender.58 
The challenge of demographics is compounded in countries where the 
safety and security of the transgender community is compromised by 
higher levels of transphobia, which can force the transgender community 
underground.  According to Jack Harrison-Quintana, Policy Institute Man-
ager at the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, there is a considerable 
lack of global data on transgender demographics, and the culturally-
specific articulations of transgender identity vary too much for it to be ap-
propriate to apply United States or European population estimates to other 
countries.59  With these cautions in mind, this article will not attempt to cap-
ture the size of the transgender community in other countries. 
 
III(B).  DEMOGRAPHICS OF INTERSEX PERSONS 
The demographics of the intersex community are also difficult to estab-
lish, as the discovery that a newborn displays intersex characteristics is of-
ten met with a private parental and medical decision to choose a gender for 
a child, along with the companion emotions of embarrassment and shamed 
silence.60  Otherwise put, as a new parent of an intersex child, imagine the 
potential discomfort experienced when people ask the standard question of 
whether you had a boy or a girl, and you don’t know exactly how to an-
swer.  Even the decision to dress the baby in the traditional gendered colors 
of pink or blue would be cause for potential distress and confusion.   Also, 
the presence of intersex characteristics may not be recognized until later in 
life, making an accurate mapping of the intersex community a difficult 
task.61 
In Transforming the Debate: Why We Need to Include Transgender Rights in 
the Struggles for Sex and Sexual Orientation Equality, Taylor Flynn estimated 
that one in every 2,000 children are born intersex.62  Gender Spectrum, a 
United States based education, training and support organization for trans-
                                                
57. EUR. UNION AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, EUROPEAN UNION LESBIAN, GAY, 
BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER SURVEY, RESULTS AT A GLANCE, 27 (2013), available at 
http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/eu-lgbt-survey-results-at-a-glance_en.pdf.  Accord-
ing to the survey, “[w]ithin the transgender group (6,771 respondents), the largest subgroups 
were persons who were currently transsexual or had a transsexual past (1,813), transgender 
(1,066), queer (1,016) and ‘other’ (1,683). Two thirds (62 %) of transgender respondents said 
that they had been assigned a male sex at birth, whereas 38 % had been assigned a female sex.” 
Id. at 27 n.17.     
58. Id.  
59. E-mail from Jack Harrison-Quintana, Policy Institute Manager, Nat’l Gay and Lesbian Task 
Force, to Research Assistant Sandy James (May 10, 2013, 14:09 EST) (on file with author). 
60. Elizabeth Weil, What if It’s (Sort of) a Boy and (Sort of) a Girl?, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 24, 2006, avail-
able at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/24/magazine/24intersexkids.html. 
61. Nat’l Library of Med., Intersex, MEDLINE PLUS (Feb. 26, 2014), 
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/001669.htm.  Otherwise put, if there ex-
ists a discrepancy between external genitals (penis/vagina) and internal genitals (tes-
tes/ovaries), such a discovery of the internal findings might not be realized until puberty, 
when inconsistent sexual characteristics manifest themselves.  
62. Flynn, supra note 46, at 393 n.5.  
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gender issues, uses a more expansive definition of intersex that encom-
passes a wider range of conditions and asserts a significantly higher inci-
dence. The organization maintains that approximately 1% of children are 
born with chromosomes, hormones, genitalia and/or other sex characteris-
tics that are not exclusively male or female as defined by the medical estab-
lishment.63  In How Sexually Dimorphic Are We?  Review and Synthesis, the 
authors concluded that the frequency of intersexuality “might be as high as 
2% of all live births” while the percentage of persons receiving “corrective 
genital surgery” probably “runs between 1 and 2 per 1000 (0.1 to 0.2%).64    
 
IV.  INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
Transgender legal protections were not a piece of the conversation dur-
ing the earliest contemplation of a permanent international criminal court. 
The notion of a standing international court to deal with the prevention and 
punishment of mass atrocity dates back to December 11, 1946, with United 
Nations General Assembly Resolution 96 (I).65  The achievement of an ac-
tual permanent court with such jurisdiction took a mere fifty-two years to 
accomplish, with the establishment of the ICC on July 17, 1998.66  During 
the Cold War era, the cooperative effort required to establish an interna-
tional court with general jurisdiction over the crimes of genocide, crimes 
against humanity, and war crimes was decidedly lacking, and significant 
steps forward for international justice for victims of mass atrocity did not 
occur.   
Due in part to the end of the Cold War and a new spirit of international 
cooperation, two ad hoc criminal courts were established by the U.N. Secu-
rity Council to reestablish international peace and security in the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 1993 and Rwanda (ICTR) in 1994.67  These two ad hoc 
courts were an important development in the search for justice after mass 
atrocity and also serve as an important gauge of how the ICC judges might 
deal with the issues attendant to the consideration of genocide and crimes 
against humanity against a transgender population.  Thus, cases from the 
                                                
63.A Word About Words, supra note 48. 
64. Melanie Blackless, et. al., How Sexually Dimorphic Are We?  Review and Synthesis, AM. J. 
HUMAN BIOLOGY, 12:151-166 (2000).   
65. The Crime of Genocide, G.A. Res. 96 (I), U.N. Doc. A/96/I (Dec. 11, 1946), available at 
http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/033/47/IMG/NR003347.pdf?OpenElement. 
66. About the Court, INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/about%20the%20court/Pages/about%20the%20court.aspx (last visited 
Mar. 5, 2014). 
67. U.N Security Council Resolution 808 (1993) established the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).  The full text of Resolution 808 is available at 
http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Statute/statute_808_1993_en.pdf.  U.N. Secu-
rity Council Resolution 955 (1994) established the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
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ad hoc tribunals will be discussed at length below, even though they lack 
precedential authority in the ICC.68   
At least hypothetically, the possibility exists that the U.N. Security 
Council could establish an ad hoc tribunal to address mass atrocity against 
a transgender population.69  However, the establishment of the permanent 
International Criminal Court on July 17, 1998 created general jurisdiction to 
prosecute and punish the Crime of Genocide (Article 6), Crimes Against 
Humanity (Article 7), and War Crimes (Article 8). 70 Thus, the focus of this 
article is on assessing the ability of the ICC to protect the global transgender 
community from genocide and crimes against humanity.  Since the specter 
of mass atrocity against transgender persons seems unlikely to come atten-
dant to “an armed conflict” as required by Article 8, this paper will not as-
sess the ICC’s ability to pursue war crimes charges in the event of mass 
atrocity against a transgender population. 
The jurisdiction of the ICC is set forth in Article 5 of the Rome Statute, 
which states that the Court has jurisdiction over two crimes relevant to our 
discussion: Genocide under Article 6 and Crimes Against Humanity under 
Article 7.71  Although this paper concludes that neither Article 6 nor Article 
7 significantly protects transgender persons, and the court’s non-binding 
dicta in the Bashir case does not signal that the court is seriously consider-
ing expanding such protection, the analysis in this article remains impor-
tant because considerable violence is perpetrated against transgender per-
sons, all around the world, every day.  With this violence and the fear of an 
increase in future violence in mind, this article discusses the gaps or grey 
areas in the law in the hope that the combined efforts of the legal, political, 
diplomatic, and advocacy communities could result in greater international 
criminal legal protection for transgender persons going forward. 
 
V.  GENOCIDE AND TRANSGENDER AND INTERSEX PERSONS 
The crime of genocide is defined in Article 6 of the Rome Statute as fol-
lows: 
 
For the purpose of this Statute, "genocide" means any of the follow-
ing acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a na-
                                                
68. Article 21 of the Rome Statute spells out the applicable law for the ICC.  Nowhere in Article 
21 does it express that the court is bound to follow the rules of the ad hoc tribunals, although 
the article does indicate that the court shall apply “principles and rules of international law.”   
Rome Statute at Art. 21. 
69. For a complete examination of the power of the United Nations to establish an ad hoc 
criminal tribunal, see Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defense Motion 
for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 
1995) available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acdec/en/51002.htm. 
70. Rome Statute at Art. 5. Neither War Crimes under Article 8, nor the still prospective Crime 
of Aggression, will not be discussed in this article, which is concerned with societal violence 
rather than armed conflict. 
71. Id. 
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tional, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:  
 
(a) Killing members of the group; 
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the 
group;  
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated  
to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; 
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the 
group; 
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.72  
 
It does not require considerable imagination to conclude that a number 
of the actus rei enumerated in Article 6 could be committed against trans-
gender persons, with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, the group.  
Indeed, killing and causing serious bodily and mental harm and deliberate 
infliction of conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruc-
tion have all been inflicted upon transgender populations in recent his-
tory.73  However, the contentious and restrictive negotiations that resulted 
in the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (hereinafter “The Genocide Convention”) and the Rome Statute 
suggest that such violence against transgender persons cannot be consid-
ered genocide.   
 
A.  Prima Facie Limitations on the Crime of Genocide 
As noted in the previous section, the 1948 Genocide Convention and 
Article 6 of the Rome Statute both specify that genocide is committed with 
“the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or re-
ligious group.”74  
Thus, in order to be protected on the face of The Genocide Convention 
and Article 6 of the Rome Statute, transgender persons would have to be 
considered a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group.  This analysis, 
                                                
72. Id. at art. 6. 
73. See supra note 10 for details about transgender killings in Iraq and the estimated number of 
transgender killings globally. As to violence more generally, physical violence against trans-
gender persons is common in the United States.  A study surveying nearly 6,500 transgender 
Americans found that thirty-five percent of transgender persons had experienced some type of 
physical assault because they were transgender. JAMIE M. GRANT, NAT’L CTR. FOR 
TRANSGENDER EQUAL. & NAT’L GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE, INJUSTICE AT EVERY TURN: A 
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL TRANSGENDER DISCRIMINATION SURVEY (2011), available at 
http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/reports/ntds_full.pdf, at 3.  For a compre-
hensive report on violence against transgender women in Latin America, see INTERNATIONAL 
HIV/AIDS ALLIANCE, THE NIGHT IS ANOTHER COUNTRY: IMPUNITY AND VIOLENCE AGAINST 
TRANSGENDER WOMEN HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS IN LATIN AMERICA (2012), available at 
http://issuu.com/aids_alliance/docs/ thenightisanothercountry. 
74. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, art. 2, Jan. 12, 
1951, 1021 U.N.T.S. 78 (hereinafter “Genocide Convention”); Rome Statute, art. 6, July 17, 1998, 
2187 U.N.T.S. 90. 
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conducted below, proves impossible.    
The issue of protected group membership has been the topic of signifi-
cant international debate since its earliest implementation in the 1948 Geno-
cide Convention, and was also discussed in the Preparatory Committees 
leading up to the creation of the Rome Statute.75  Neither the Rome Statute 
nor the accompanying Elements of Crimes have further defined the four 
groups protected under the statute.76  Thus, in order to determine whether 
the ICC might consider transgender persons to be a national, ethnical, racial 
or religious group, we must look to other sources of law.   
1.  Can Transgender Persons Be Considered a “National Group?” 
The ICTR in Prosecutor v. Akayesu held “that a national group is defined 
as a collection of people who are perceived to share a legal bond based on 
common citizenship . . . .”77 Scholars such as Christine Byron have con-
curred that the purpose of protecting national groups is to protect groups 
with a particular citizenship that might be targeted with violence78—for ex-
ample, Americans living in Pakistan or Rwandans living in Uganda.  
This definition of a national group does not protect the global trans-
gender community, because the global transgender population shares no 
legal bond of common citizenship.  Even if the transgender population of a 
particular nation were targeted—for example, if transgender Italians were 
targeted with any of the actus rei listed above—they would not be protected 
as transgender Italians, but rather as Italians, that is, as part of a group that 
shares a legal bond based on common citizenship.  Their transgender status 
would be irrelevant.  
2.  Can Transgender Persons Qualify as an “Ethnical Group”? 
The ICTR in Prosecutor v. Rutaganda stated that there is no generally and 
internationally accepted definition of an ethnical group.79  Seeking to pro-
vide some clarity, in Prosecutor v. Akayesu, the ICTR defined an ethnical 
group as “a group whose members share a common language or culture.”80   
Using the Akayesu test, the global transgender community cannot be 
considered an ethnical group, as transgender persons are a meta-group that 
spans boundaries of language and culture.  Continuing the example of the 
transgender Italian community, if the Italian-American community were 
targeted with violence, they may qualify as an ethnical group due to their 
Italian-American origins and the indication of shared language and culture.  
                                                
75. The crime of genocide, and the list of groups protected, is identically defined in the Geno-
cide Convention, the ICTR and ICTY, and the Rome Statute of the ICC.  
76. Christine Byron, The Crime of Genocide, in THE PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES, 143, 155 (Dominick McGoldrick et al. eds., 2004). 
77. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 512 (Sept. 2, 1998). 
78. Byron, supra note 76, at 157. 
79. Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, Judgment, ¶ 55. 
80. Akayesu ¶ 513. 
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However, if the transgender Italian-American community were targeted 
because they are transgender, they would receive no protection as an ethni-
cal group, as transgender group membership does not require shared lan-
guage or culture.   
An argument could be made that transgender persons, regionally or na-
tionally, might share a culture, and thus exist as an ethnic group, revolving 
around their identification as transgender persons.  However, there is pres-
ently no language common to a regional or national group of transgender 
persons that is not also shared by the non-transgender population of the 
same region or nation.  For example, simply because the transgender popu-
lation of the United States, by and large, shares the common language of 
English, this would not qualify them as an ethnic group under the Akayesu 
decision.  What would seem to be required by Akayesu is that the trans-
gender population share a language distinct from the language of other 
groups inhabiting the same region or nation.  This is evidenced by the fact 
that the court in Akayesu could not determine that the Tutsi were an ethnic 
group, in part because they did not speak a different language than the 
Hutu of Rwanda (both groups speak Kinyarwanda).    
Thus, what is left to consider is whether there is a more broadly defined 
shared transgender culture, forged with transgender identity at its center.  
This contemplation deserves greater consideration and study as to whether 
a regional or national transgender group can truly be considered to share in 
a “transgender culture.”  However, as our working definition of trans-
gender is incredibly broad and encompasses such disparate groups as 
transsexuals, transgender persons, transvestites, cross-dressers, androgyne, 
polygender, genderqueer, agender, and gender variant persons, it seems 
difficult to establish the existence of a shared culture encompassing all 
groups under the transgender umbrella term.  The culture argument is fur-
ther complicated by taking into account that many transgender persons 
display no outward and visible signs of their transgender nature  
3.  Are Transgender Persons a “Racial Group?” 
Both the Akayesu case and the Kayishema and Ruzindana case from the 
ICTR defined a racial group “based on the hereditary physical traits often 
identified with a geographical region.”81  In the case of the global trans-
gender community, there is no commonality of hereditary physical traits 
based on geography that binds the group together.  If, for example, African-
Americans were targeted for violence based on the fact that the members 
were African-American, they would be protected as a “racial group.”   
However, if African-Americans were targeted because they were trans-
gender and not because they were African-Americans, they would not be 
protected under the statute because their transgender group membership is 
not based on hereditary physical traits.  It seems curious, if not perverse, 
                                                
81. Akayesu ¶ 514; Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, Judgment, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, 
¶ 98 (May 21, 1999).    
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that a group of African-American transgender persons targeted because 
they are African-American are protected from genocide, while the same ex-
act group of African American transgender persons targeted not because of 
their race but because they are transgender would not be so protected.  
However, this considerable gap demonstrates the current state of the law. 
4.  Are Transgender Persons a Religious Group? 
It seems clear from the above three sections, as well as from basic logic, 
that transgender persons are not a religious group for the purposes of Arti-
cle 6 protection from genocide.  However, the term “religion” remains un-
defined as a matter of international law.82 Thus we again look to case law 
from the ICTR for guidance on the meaning of “religious group,” which 
“suggests that a religious group is one whose members share the same re-
ligion, denomination or mode of worship.”83  The global transgender com-
munity shares none of these commonalities and thus does not qualify as a 
religious group.  Nor would, for example, transgender Muslims receive 
protection as a religious group if they were targeted due to their status as 
transgender persons.   
5.  Conclusion 
In summary, while a transgender population may be considered a 
group and may be targeted as a group for violence by malefactors, they are 
not protected by the plain text of either the 1948 Genocide Convention or 
the 1998 Rome Statute.  They do not qualify as a national, ethnical, racial or 
religious group for purposes of Article 6, and are thus outside the protec-
tive ambit of protection from genocide.   
     
B.  The Legacy of the Akayesu Case—An Avenue for Protection Against 
Mass Atrocity for Transgender Persons  
As discussed above, the plain text of the Genocide Convention and the 
Rome Statute clearly state that four groups—national, ethnical, racial and 
religious in nature—are protected.84  However, debate since 1948 has put 
into question whether the protections of the Genocide Convention and 
Rome Statute are limited to these four groups. The ICTR’s Akayesu ruling 
                                                
82. T. Jeremy Gunn, The Complexity of Religion and the Definition of “Religion” in International 
Law, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 189, 189-90 (2003). 
83. Byron, supra note 76, at 159 (citations omitted). 
84. While transgender persons certainly exist within all national, ethnic, racial and religious 
groups, their mere existence within each of the four groups protected by the Genocide Con-
vention and Article 6 would not afford them protection from genocide.  The key to any geno-
cide prosecution is that the perpetrators intended to destroy the “group” and that “group” is 
protected.  Since transgender persons are not an explicitly protected group, they are outside of 
the ambit of the statute. 
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offers a ray of hope for the transgender population, as the Court displayed 
a willingness to expand protection beyond the groups initially set forth in 
the definition of the ICC.  
With almost fifty years of discussion as to the scope of group member-
ship protection before it, the ICTR in Akayesu found it difficult to place the 
Tutsi firmly within the four groups protected by Article 6, but nonetheless 
decided that the Tutsi were entitled to protection, stating: “it is particularly 
important to respect the intention of the drafters of the Genocide Conven-
tion, which according to the negotiating history, was patently to ensure the 
protection of any stable and permanent group.”85   The court held that:  
[T]he crime of genocide was allegedly perceived as targeting only 
“stable” groups, constituted in a permanent fashion and member-
ship of which is determined by birth, with the exclusion of the 
more “mobile” groups which one joins through individual volun-
tary commitment, such as political and economic groups. There-
fore, a common criterion in the four types of groups protected by 
the Genocide Convention is that membership in such groups would 
seem to be normally not challengeable by its members, who belong 
to it automatically, by birth, in a continuous and often irremediable 
manner.86  
This ruling, which expanded group membership protection to “any 
stable and permanent group,” may lend hope to the protection of trans-
gender persons if they can be considered a stable and permanent group. 
 
1.  Are Transgender Persons a Stable and Permanent Group? 
The threshold issue, before permanence and stability, is whether trans-
gender persons qualify as a group in the first place.  In Akayesu, the Court 
relied upon two main factors to establish an identifiable group:  identifica-
tion as a group by others, and self-identification.87  Using these dual criteria, 
the court found that others identified the Tutsi as a group (in their case, an 
ethnic group).  The court also found it dispositive that the Tutsi self-
identified as an ethnic group, regardless of whether or not they actually 
were an ethnic group using the language and culture test of ethnicity set 
forth above.   
Using the twin Akayesu test, transgender persons seem to demonstrate a 
significant level of cohesive group membership.   The targeted and inten-
tional violence against transgender persons, in a multitude of countries, 
demonstrates that others identify transgender persons as a group.  In addi-
                                                
85. Akayesu ¶ 516; see also Byron, supra note 76, at 157; David Lisson, Defining "National Group" 
in the Genocide Convention: A Case Study of Timor-Leste, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1459 (2008). 
86. Akayesu ¶ 511. 
87. Akayesu ¶ 702. 
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tion, the multitude of local, national, regional, and global transgender activ-
ist organizations, support groups, and related resources signal that trans-
gender persons self-identify as a group.  As the analysis seems to support 
the proposition that transgender persons constitute both an identified and 
self-identified group, the next level of analysis looks at whether this group 
is stable and permanent. 
 
A. Has the Transgender Community Enjoyed Permanence and Stability?  
In Akayesu, the Court found the Tutsi to be a stable and permanent 
group, and in doing so, traced the uninterrupted existence of the Tutsi from 
back to the pre-colonial era, which started in 1897, until the start of the 1994 
genocide.88   With an approximately 100-year detailed group history 
deemed sufficient to show permanence of the Tutsi, could transgender per-
sons show similar evidence to be considered a stable and permanent group 
under the Akayesu decision? 
Although the international headline-making news of Christine Jorgen-
sen’s successful sex reassignment surgery in December 1952 brought popu-
lar attention to the transgender population for the first time, research has 
demonstrated that the transgender population has existed for a significant 
period of time.89  Transgender people have been acknowledged and docu-
mented in numerous ancient civilizations and have achieved varying levels 
of significance in a number of cultures at different periods throughout his-
tory.90  Transsexual priestesses having been documented in Mesopotamian, 
Assyrian, Akkadian, and Babylonian records from as early as the third mil-
lennium B.C.E.91 Transgender people have also been documented in ancient 
Greece and Rome.92   
Moving forward to the 1500s, explorers documented their encounters 
with cultures in which individuals lived as members of the opposite gen-
der.93  One such explorer, Pedro de Magalhaes, recounted his experience 
during an expedition to Brazil in 1576 in which he documented women 
                                                
88. Akayesu ¶¶ 80-126. 
89. Christine Jorgensen was a former United States G.I. who had served in World War II and 
later underwent genital transformation surgery in Copenhagen, Denmark, to emerge as a 
“blond bombshell.” SUSAN STRYKER, TRANSGENDER HISTORY 47 (2008). The reason for her 
popularity has been attributed to her being the “first transgender person to receive significant 
media attention who happened to be from the United States, which had risen to a new level of 
international geopolitical importance in the aftermath of World War II.” Id.  
90. See generally LESLIE FEINBERG, TRANSGENDER WARRIORS: MAKING HISTORY FROM JOAN OF 
ARC TO RUPAUL (1996) (outlining the history of transgender people). 
91. Id. at 40. The male-to-female transsexual priestesses served multiple deities in these civili-
zations. Id. Some classical texts have reported as many as 5,000 transsexual women priestesses 
known as gallae in Anatolia, a part of modern-day Turkey. Id. at 41. 
92. Id. at 55-57. See also Richard Green, Mythological, Historical, and Cross-Cultural Aspects of 
Transsexualism, in CURRENT CONCEPTS IN TRANSGENDER IDENTITY 3, 5 (Dallas Denny ed., 1998) 
(Roman emperor Heliogabalus is “said to have offered half the Roman Empire to the physician 
who could equip him with female genitalia.”). 
93. See FEINBERG, supra note 90, at 22. 
21
Kritz: Global Transgender Population & the International Criminal Court
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
THE GLOBAL TRANSGENDER POPULATION AND THE ICC 2014 
22 YALE HUMAN RIGHTS & DEVELOPMENT L.J. [Vol. XVII 
among the Tupinamba who lived and were accepted as men.94  Other indi-
viduals have also documented their experiences as they traveled and en-
countered different cultures, such as French missionary Joseph Francois 
Lafitau, who described Two-Spirit people in the western Great Lakes, Lou-
isiana, and Florida in 1724: “they believe they are honored . . . they partici-
pate in all religious ceremonies, and this profession of an extraordinary life 
causes them to be regarded as people of higher order . . . .”95  In many cul-
tures, transgender people have been integrated into society and have occu-
pied roles of great significance, such as transgender shamans that were 
documented in southern Chile and parts of Argentina.96 Similarly, trans-
gender people have been found to perform religious functions in some tra-
ditional Asian societies.97  
Additional reports of transgender people have been documented in 
16th through 19th century French history, such as the case of Mlle. Jenny 
Savalette de Lange, who lived as a woman and died at Versailles in 1858 
and was “discovered to be a man.”98  Evidence of transgender people also 
existed during that period of time in America,99 where officials in a number 
of cities passed ordinances making it illegal for men or women to publicly 
appear in “dress not belonging to his or her sex.”100  Reports indicate that 
up to 400 male Civil War soldiers were in fact born female,101 including 
Congressional Medal of Honor recipient, Dr. Mary Walker, a Union sur-
geon.102 
The 20th century saw an increase in the documentation of the trans-
gender population with numerous medical and psychological advances and 
the work of scientists such as Magnus Hirschfeld and Harry Benjamin, who 
devoted a significant amount of their practice to transgender people.103  De-
                                                
94. Id.   
95. Id. at 23. 
96. Leslie Feinberg, Transgender Liberation: A Movement Whose Time Has Come, in THE 
TRANSGENDER STUDIES READER, 205, 215 (Susan Stryker & Stephen Whittle eds., 2006). 
97. FEINBERG, supra note 90, at 44-45 (“Transgendered identities and practices have been 
documented in every traditional Asian society. In some Asian traditions, transgendered fig-
ures perform religious or quasi-religious functions.”). These include the basaja of Indonesian 
island of Sulawesi, hijra of India, and mudang of Korea. Id. 
98. Richard Green, supra note 92, at 7. Mlle. Savalette de Lange also acquired a substitute birth 
certificate with a female gender, was engaged to men six times, and “was given a thousand 
francs a year pension by the King of France with a free apartment at the Chateau of Versailles.” 
Id.  
99. See GORDENE OLGA MACKENZIE, TRANSGENDER NATION 32 (1994). Reports of trans people 
can be found in newspapers, legal records, medical journals and writings of early sexologists, 
such as the 1881 Chicago Medical Review report of the first Colonial governor of NY, Edward 
Hyde (aka Lord Cornbury) frequently appearing in public wearing women’s clothing. Id. at 32. 
100. STRYKER, supra note 89, at 31. 
101. FEINBERG, supra note 90, at 37. 
102. VICKI L. EAKLOR, QUEER AMERICA: A GLBT HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 29 (2008). Dr. 
Mary Walker “differed from the passing women. Her intention was not to disguise herself as a 
man, but to wear male clothing as a woman.” Id. She continued cross-dressing after the war 
until her death in 1919. Id. 
103. Magnus Hirschfeld coined the term “transvestite” and wrote The Transvestites in 1910, 
which is described as “the first book-length treatment of the phenomena.” STRYKER, supra note 
86, at 39. Psychiatrist Max Marcuse described a “Geschlechtsumwandlungstreib (drive for sex 
transformation)” in 1913. Id. at 38. Endocrinologist Harry Benjamin moved to the U.S. in 1913 
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spite Christine Jorgensen’s prominence, she was not the first transgender 
woman to undergo surgery. The first gender reassignment surgery is com-
monly believed to have been conducted in the 1920s when Einar Wegener 
underwent male-to-female surgery to become Lili Elbe.104 Dora Richter’s 
male-to-female genital transformation surgery in 1931 is reported to be the 
first documented surgery of its kind.105  In addition to medical advances, 
the middle of the 20th century also brought about social and technological 
advances that allowed the transgender population to “interconnect with 
networks of socially powerful people in ways that would produce long-
lasting organizations and provide the base of a social movement.”106  These 
historical markers are merely examples of the existence of transgender per-
sons throughout human history—potentially constituting sufficient evi-
dence to satisfy the standard articulated in the Akayesu decision.   
 
  B.  Is Transgender Status Irremediable? 
In order to prove that transgender persons are a stable and permanent 
group under the Akayesu test, it must also be established that being a trans-
gender individual is irremediable. Membership in the group must not be 
voluntary, such as in a political group, or transient, such as (potentially) in 
an economic group.  While there are no proven scientific explanations for 
why people are transgender, it is clear that many transgender persons be-
lieve that they were born transgender, and that it is an innate part of who 
they have been since birth.107  Some transgender persons report being aware 
that they are transgender from their earliest conscious thoughts and memo-
ries.108  Such testimonies demonstrate the irremediable nature of being a 
transgender person.  Medical theories also point to this irremediable nature, 
attributing it to fluctuations or imbalances in hormones or the use of certain 
medications during pregnancy.109  Other research indicates that there are 
links between transgender identity and brain structure.110   
In any case, there is a strong argument that transgender identification is 
neither voluntary nor transient.  This argument would conclude that trans-
gender persons are transgender permanently, not as a passing phase or 
fancy.  Thus, if the ICC were to follow Akayesu, transgender persons may be 
                                                                                                             
and became the leading medical authority on transsexuality in the 1950s. Id. at 40. Dr. Benja-
min published The Transsexual Phenomenon in 1966, EAKLOR, supra note 102, at xxiii, and estab-
lished the Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Association (currently the World 
Professional Association for Transgender Health-WPATH) in 1980. Id. at xxv.  
104. RICHARD F. DOCTER, TRANSVESTITES AND TRANSSEXUALS: TOWARD A THEORY OF CROSS-
GENDER BEHAVIOR 7 (1988). 
105. STRYKER, supra note 89, at 39. 
106. Id. at 41. 
107. NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUALITY, UNDERSTANDING TRANSGENDER: FREQUENTLY 
ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT TRANSGENDER PEOPLE 1 (2009), available at 
http://transequality.org/Resources/NCTE_UnderstandingTrans.pdf. 
108. Id.  
109. Id.   
110. Id.   
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protected under the auspices of Article 6 of the Rome Statute. 
 
2. Will the ICC Follow Akayesu? 
The Akayesu court considered the Tutsi to be a stable and permanent 
group protected by the spirit of the Genocide Convention.  This ruling rep-
resents an opportunity for the ICC to add protected groups ejusdem generis 
instead of maintaining a closed list of four protected groups, but the rulings 
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 
the discussions of the Preparatory Committee of the ICC (PrepCom) and 
the ICC’s own rulings in the Bashir case indicate that an expanded defini-
tion is an unlikely outcome.111 
In the first ruling on the scope of protected group membership since the 
Akayesu case, the ICTY declined to follow Akayesu and expand the Genocide 
Convention to cover non-enumerated groups, holding in Krstić that the ap-
plication of the Genocide Convention is confined to the four enumerated 
groups.  In its ruling, the Court stated that “the Genocide Convention does 
not protect all types of human groups.  Its application is confined to na-
tional, ethnical, racial and religious groups.”112   
In an ominous signal for the prospects of inclusion of transgender per-
sons under the Rome Statute, the Preparatory Committee on the Establish-
ment of an ICC (PrepCom) indicated that the expansive Akayesu definition 
would not necessarily be followed by the ICC.113 
While no precedential relationship exists between rulings of the ICC, 
the majority’s discussion of protected groups in the Decision on the Prosecu-
tion's Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir 
may also indicate its reluctance to include non-enumerated groups within 
Article 6.  At Paragraph 114, the majority court “highlights that the crime of 
genocide is characterised by the fact that it targets a specific national, eth-
nic, racial or religious group.”114  At Paragraph 134, the majority court states 
that “victims must belong to a particular national, ethnic, racial or religious 
group;” and the court restates the point almost identically in Paragraph 
                                                
111. In addition, scholars such as Christine Byron have declared Akayesu’s approach to not be 
supported by the ordinary meaning of Article 2 of the Genocide Convention and its travaux 
préperatoires. Byron, supra note 87, at 161. Paul Bettwy called the Akayesu decision “bold and 
controversial” and said that it captured only part of the objects and purposes of the Genocide 
Convention. Paul Shea Bettwy, The Genocide Convention and Unprotected Groups: Is the Scope of 
Protection Exanding Under Customary International Law?, NOTRE DAME J. INT’L & COMP. L. 167, 
181 (2011). 
112. Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33, Judgment, ¶ 554 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Aug. 2, 2011). Of course, the ICC is not bound to follow the rulings of the ad hoc 
tribunals, but might be inclined to consider their rulings in their deliberations. 
113. Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an Int’l Criminal Court, UN REPORT OF 
THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT, available at U.N. Doc.PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 (Nov. 2, 2002) (listing exhaustively the 
elements of crimes under the Rome Statute). 
114. Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision on the Prosecution’s Appli-
cation for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ¶ 114 (Mar. 4, 2009).  
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135.115   
Similarly, the partially dissenting opinion of Judge Anita Ušacka clearly 
limits the definition of protected groups by stating that “Article 6 of the 
Statute . . . extends protection only to national, ethnical, racial or religious 
groups.”116   
While the ICC is not bound by its prior rulings, the sympathies of the 
court seem, at the moment, to lie with a strict textual reading of the Rome 
Statute allowing only the four enumerated groups to enjoy protection un-
der Article 6.  These sympathies, if unchanged, would keep violence against 
transgender persons, no matter how extensive or horrible, unprotected by 
genocide law.  The problem is compounded by the reality that the global 
transgender community, thanks both to its small population and its unique 
composition, is also significantly left outside of Article 7 protection against 
crimes against humanity. 
 
VI.  CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY AND TRANSGENDER PERSONS 
Article 7 of the Rome Statute defines a “Crime Against Humanity” as: 
 
[A]ny of the following acts when committed as part of a wide-
spread or systematic attack directed against any civilian popula-
tion, with knowledge of the attack: 
(a)     Murder;  
(b)     Extermination;   
(c)     Enslavement;  
(d)     Deportation or forcible transfer of population;   
(e)     Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty 
in      violation of fundamental rules of international law;   
(f)     Torture;  
(g)     Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, 
enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of com-
parable gravity;  
(h)     Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on 
political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as de-
fined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally recog-
nized as impermissible under international law, in connection with 
any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the juris-
diction of the Court;  
(i)     Enforced disappearance of persons;  
(j)     The crime of apartheid;   
(k)     Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally caus-
ing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physi-
                                                
115. Id. ¶ 134; in paragraph 135, the court states that “the Majority is of the view that the tar-
geted group must have particular positive characteristics (national, ethnic, racial or religious), 
and not a lack thereof.” Id. ¶ 135. 
116. Id. ¶ 21. 
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cal health.117 
 
Again, it is all too easy to imagine the commission of any number of 
crimes against a transgender community that would satisfy one or more ac-
tus reus required to satisfy Article 7.  The problem for the transgender 
community, whether local, domestic, regional, or international, is that due 
to the limited numbers of transgender persons, and the expansive and in-
clusive definition of “transgender,” it is practically impossible to satisfy the 
requirement for prosecution under Article 7. In other words, it is hard to 
imagine an attack against a transgender civilian population, that is suffi-
ciently widespread and/or systematic to constitute a crime against human-
ity.   
 
A.  Widespread and Systematic or Widespread or Systematic?  
A successful prosecution under Article 7 requires satisfaction of a cha-
peau element: that the conduct was committed as part of a widespread or 
systematic attack.118  On its face, it seems clear that Article 7 and the com-
panion Elements of Crimes requires an attack on a civilian population to 
either be widespread or systematic, not both widespread and systematic. 
The Akayesu case from the ICTR supported this conclusion, holding that 
“the act can be part of a widespread or systematic attack and need not be a 
part of both.”119  Similarly, the Kayishema and Ruzindana case, also from the 
ICTR, held that the “attack must contain one of the alternative conditions of 
being widespread or systematic.” Both the Vukovar Hospital Decision and the 
Tadic cases from the ICTY also held that only one or the other is required.120  
In another example, in the Djordjević Trial Chamber Judgment, the Court 
found that “the attack must be widespread or systematic, the requirement 
being disjunctive rather than cumulative.”121  
However, academic discourse that took place between these ad hoc rul-
ings and the first ICC ruling on this “and/or issue” indicated that the ICC 
might interpret Article 7(1) to require something in between the disjunctive 
                                                
117. Rome Statute Art. 7. 
118. The requirement that a civilian population must be the directed target of a crime against 
humanity is also required.  Thus, it must be proved that a civilian population, in our case a 
civilian population of transgender persons, was a directed target of a crime against humanity.  
The requirement that a civilian population must be the directed target of a crime against hu-
manity was non-controversial for the Working Group on Crimes Against Humanity, and did 
not encounter significant debate during the creation of Article 7. For a general discussion of 
the negotiation sessions, see Darryl Robinson, Defining “Crimes Against Humanity” at the Rome 
Conference, 93 AM.J.INT’L L. 45 (1999). 
119. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, ¶ 579. 
120. Kayishema and Ruzindana ¶123, ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Mile Mrkšić Veselin 
Šlijivančanin, Review of the Indictment Pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence, Case No. IT -95-13-R61, T.Ch.I, 3 Apr. 1996 (“Vukovar Hospital Decision”), Prosecu-
tor v. Dusko Tadic, IT-94-1-T, Judgment of May 7, 1997, at 646. 
121. Djordjević Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶1590.   
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and conjunctive based on the requirements of Article 7(2)(a).122  In the years 
between the ad hoc tribunals and the first on point rulings of the ICC, this 
issue was very much in limbo, with the possibility that the ICC might sim-
ply require that an attack be widespread or systematic as a proverbial floor, 
and something between the disjunctive and the conjunctive as a proverbial 
ceiling.  
Finally, the ICC had the opportunity to rule on this issue in Prosecutor v. 
Jean Bemba Gombo.123  While keeping in mind that the ICC’s rulings lack stare 
decisis, it seems that the ICC is currently requiring a widespread or system-
atic attack. In the Bemba case, Pre-Trial Chamber II ruled “if it finds the at-
tack to be widespread, it need not consider whether the attack was also sys-
tematic.”124  With the Bemba “or” ruling clearly in mind, we must now ask 
what the terms widespread and systematic actually mean. 
 
B.  The Meaning of Widespread  
As was noted by the Katanga case, The Rome Statute and its accompa-
nying Elements of Crimes do not define the terms widespread and system-
atic.125  In the absence of such guidance, we are left to consider cases out of 
the ad hoc tribunals, the 1996 International Law Commission Report on the 
Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and the Security of Mankind (here-
inafter, “ILC Draft Code”), a small handful of rulings from the ICC itself, 
and common sense as potential sources of guidance.126  
 
Case Law from the Ad Hoc Tribunals on the Meaning of Widespread 
In the Akayesu case, the ICTR ruled that “the concept of ‘widespread' 
may be defined as massive, frequent, large-scale action, carried out collec-
tively with considerable seriousness and directed against a multiplicity of 
victims.”127  The Ruzindana and Kayishema court also opined on the meaning 
of “widespread”, finding that a “widespread attack is one that is directed 
against a multiplicity of victims.”128  This requirement of a multiplicity of 
                                                
122. Essentially, the academic discussion is whether the requirement of Article 7(2)(a) “has the 
practical effect of rendering the qualifying terms ‘widespread’ and ‘systematic’ as joint re-
quirements rather than in the alternative as the use of the disjunctive ‘or’ . . . would suggest. 
See Timothy LH McCormack, Crimes Against Humanity, in THE PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT 187 (Dominick	  McGoldrick	  et	  al.	  eds.,	  2004).  
123. Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo, Decision on the Charges of the Prosecutor, Pre-Trial Cham-
ber II, ICC-01/05-01/08, June 15, 2009. 
124.Id. ¶ 82. 
125. Prosecutor v. Katanga, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, Pre-Trial I, ICC-01/04-
01/07-717, 1 October 2008, ¶ 394. 
126. Id. 
127. Akayesu ¶ 580. 
128. Kayishema and Ruzindana ¶ 123. 
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victims was also followed by the ICTY in the Tadic decision.”129  In the Ku-
narac and Kordic cases, the ICTY found that the “term ‘widespread’ refers to 
the large scale nature of the attack and the number of victims.”130  The ILC 
Draft Code also decided to use the term “large scale” in lieu of “wide-
spread,” but also determined that for an attack to be large scale, it would 
require a multiplicity of victims.131  Inconveniently for our purposes, the ad 
hoc tribunals were silent on what constitutes a “multiplicity.”  Thus, the 
state of the law seems ultimately unclear as to the number of victims, or 
scope of an attack, required to satisfy the requirement of a multiplicity.  So, 
with the limited guidance above in mind, the following section will explore 
whether the ICC has clarified the meaning of the term widespread. 
 
Case Law from the ICC on the Meaning of Widespread 
In the Katanga case, the Chamber held, while citing ICTY jurisprudence, 
that the adjective ‘widespread’ connotes the large-scale nature of the attack 
and the number of targeted persons, but declined to provide any definition 
of what these terms actually meant in terms of raw numbers of victims.132  
The Katanga Pre-Trial Chamber does discuss the issue of widespread in 
terms of geography or territory in some detail, stating that the term “wide-
spread” can encompass either a small or large geographical area but gave 
only general guidance that an attack must be directed against a “large 
number of civilians.”133  Other ICC Chambers have indicated the number of 
victims to be an important indicator of “widespread” but they have also de-
clined to give any guidance as to what raw numbers constitute enough vic-
tims to qualify as widespread for Article 7 purposes.134  So, in summary, it is 
quite unclear the exact number of victims that would be required for an at-
tack to be considered widespread.  This quandary will be revisited in 
greater detail below when we ask the question of whether an attack against 
a transgender and/or intersex population could be considered to be wide-
spread.  Before we begin that discussion, we must first explore the issue of 
what would make an attack systematic, the alternative requirement to a 
widespread attack, under Article 7.   
 
                                                
129. The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, IT-94-1-T, Judgment of May 7, 1997, at 648; 1996 ILC Re-
port on the Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and the Security of Mankind, Article 18, 
commentary ¶ 4. 
130. Kunarac Appeal Judgment, ¶ 96, and Kordic Appeal Judgment, ¶ 94.   
131. Tadic ¶ 648, 1996 ILC Report on the Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and the Secu-
rity of Mankind, Article 18, commentary ¶ 4. 
132. Katanga ¶ 394.   
133. Id. ¶ 395.   
134. Prosecutor v. Gbagbo, Public Redacted version of “decision of the Prosecutor’s application 
pursuant to Article 58 for a warrant of arrest against Laurent Koudou Gbagbo,” Pre-Trial 
Chamber III, 
ICC-02/11-01/11-19, Nov 30, 2011, ¶ 49; Prosecutor v Bemba Gombo, Decision on the Charges of 
the Prosecutor Against Jean-Peirre Bemba Gombo, Pre-Trial Chamber II, ICC-01/05-01/08, 15 
June 2009, ¶ 83. 
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C.  The Meaning of Systematic 
Case Law from the Ad Hoc Tribunals and Guidance from the ILC Draft 
Code on the Meaning of Systematic 
 The court in Akayesu ruled that the “concept of ‘systematic' may be 
defined as thoroughly organized and following a regular pattern on the ba-
sis of a common policy involving substantial public or private resources.  
There is no requirement that this policy must be adopted formally as the 
policy of a state.  There must however be some kind of preconceived plan 
or policy.”135  The court in Kayishema and Ruzindana found that a “systematic 
attack means an attack carried out pursuant to a preconceived policy or 
plan.”136  The ILC Draft Code defined systematic as "meaning pursuant to a 
preconceived plan or policy. . . . The thrust of this requirement is to exclude 
random acts that were not committed as part of a broader plan or policy."137   
The requirement of a pattern or methodical plan or policy was also sup-
ported by the Tadic decision.138  In the Djordjević Judgment, the court cited 
the Kunarac Appeal Judgment and the Kordic Appeal Judgment, in finding that 
“the phrase ‘systematic’ refers to the organized nature of the acts of vio-
lence and the improbability of their random occurrence.”139 
 
Case Law from the ICC on the Meaning of Systematic 
In the Katanga case, the Pre-Trial Chamber ruled that the adjective “sys-
tematic” refers to the organized nature of the acts of violence and the im-
probability of their random occurrence.140  Discussing the term in greater 
detail, the Chamber understood the term as “either an organized plan in 
furtherance of a common policy, which follows a regular pattern and re-
sults in a continuous commission of acts or as ‘patterns of crimes’ such that 
the crimes constitute a non-accidental repetition of similar criminal conduct 
on a regular basis.”141   In the Ivory Coast decision, the ICC equates “sys-
tematic” with “not spontaneous, isolated events” and held that the 
“planned nature of these offences, the identities of the victims and the per-
petrators and the way particular individuals were selected during the at-
tacks (i.e., those perceived to be disloyal to the government), support the 
                                                
135. Akayesu ¶ 580. 
136. Kayishema and Ruzindana ¶ 123. 
137. ILC Draft Code, at Article 18, commentary ¶ 3. 
138. Tadic  ¶ 648. 
139. Djordjevic Judgment ¶ 1590. 
140. Katanga ¶ 394. 
141. Id. ¶ 397. The Kenya Pre-Trial Chamber reiterated all of the above criteria for systematic 
and then also included a helpful synthesis of the on point rulings of the ad hoc tribunals.  See 
Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Decision pursuant to article 15 of the Rome Statute on the 
authorization of an investigation into the situation in the Republic of Kenya, March 31, 2010, 
ICC-01/09, ¶ 96. 
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conclusion that these were not spontaneous, isolated events.”142  
As a signpost for what will follow in the proceeding paragraphs, these 
legal standards will be discussed in greater detail below when the rulings 
of the ad hoc tribunals and the ICC on the meaning of widespread system-
atic are applied to the theoretical case of targeted group violence against a 
transgender and/or intersex population.  As a brief preview, the require-
ments of a significant numbers of victims, organization, policy and plan in 
order to prove that an attack is widespread or systematic will make it diffi-
cult to establish that a targeted attack on a transgender and/or intersex 
population constitutes a crime against humanity under Article 7 of the 
Rome Statute.  
 
D.  The Potential Application of Crimes Against Humanity Law to an 
Attack on a Transgender or Intersex Population 
A Widespread Attack on Transgender and/or Intersex Civilians 
As was made clear by the Tadic case, international criminal law recog-
nizes that an Article 7 attack by one person against one civilian within the 
ambit of a widespread or systematic attack against a larger civilian popula-
tion can clearly qualify as a crime against humanity, assuming a clear con-
nection between the individual incident of violence and the widespread 
and systematic attack.143  Otherwise put, the widespread or systematic re-
quirement applies to the attack, writ large.   To clarify, further ICTY juris-
prudence seems apropos: “[t]his requirement only applies to the attack it-
self, not to the individual acts of the accused. Only the attack, not the 
accused’s individual acts, must be widespread or systematic.”144  
Thus, in our case, in a scenario of widespread societal violence that en-
compasses multiple victim groups of which trans/intersex violence is a 
mere portion, it is clear that existing crimes against humanity law could in-
deed protect transgender and intersex persons as per Tadic and Djordjevic.  
Such an attack against multiple target groups could very well qualify as 
“massive, frequent, large-scale action, carried out collectively with consid-
erable seriousness” as per Akayesu, directed at a multiplicity of victims as 
per Tadic, or directed at a “large number of victims” as per Katanga.145   
However, what is the legal outcome if the scope of violence is limited to 
violence only against a transgender and/or intersex population?  Are 
transgender and/or intersex populations protected by international crimi-
nal law against an Article 7 attack only against their limited numbers?  The 
answer might depend on whether the ICC defines “widespread” as a “mul-
                                                
142. Ivory Coast Decision, ICC-02/11. 
143. Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, ICTY, Trial Chamber II, IT-94-1-T, Judgment of May 7, 1997, at 
649. 
144. Djordjevic Judgment, ¶ 1590. 
145. Akayesu ¶ 580; Kayishema and Ruzindana ¶ 123; Tadic ¶ 648; Katanga ¶ 394.   
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tiplicity of victims,” as required by the Kayishema and Ruzidana and Tadic 
rulings, or follows the more stringent Akayesu test where an attack on a 
transgender and/or intersex population would have to qualify as “massive, 
frequent and large-scale action, carried out with considerable seriousness” 
and also be directed against a multiplicity of victims in order to be consid-
ered widespread, or follows the Katanga case, requiring the vague and un-
defined “large number of victims.”146 
 
Can Transgender Persons Qualify as a Multiplicity as per Kayishema 
and Ruzindana and Tadic? 
If the ICC chooses to follow the Kayishema and Ruzindana and Tadic test 
of what it means to have a widespread attack, the ICC would require a 
“multiplicity of victims.”  Without an international legal definition of the 
term “multiplicity,” it seems logical that one can look at whether a trans-
gender or intersex population qualifies, on its own, as a multiplicity by 
combining raw numbers with common sense.  Using Dr. Gates’ estimate 
that 0.3% of the American population is transgender would allow for a po-
tential victim class of 697,529 transgender Americans.  Surely, if almost 
700,000 American transgender persons were targeted and murdered, ex-
terminated, enslaved, deported or forcibly transferred, unlawfully impris-
oned, tortured, or suffered sexual violence, enforced disappearances, apart-
heid, or other inhuman acts of a similar character, such a staggering 
number of victims would qualify as a “multiplicity.”  Similarly, in other 
countries with large populations, an attack on the entirety of that nation’s 
transgender population would surely qualify as a multiplicity of victims.  
For if a multiplicity is considered a “state of being many,” surely these 
types of number qualify as such.147  
However, consider the very different optics if we are to consider an at-
tack on the transgender population of small or smaller States and similar sui 
generis entities.  To use the most extreme example of this predicament, Vati-
can City (The Holy See) is estimated to have a population of 920 persons.148  
Using Dr. Gates’ estimate that transgender persons make up 0.3% of a 
given population, it is statistically likely that there should be 2.76 trans-
gender citizens of The Holy See.149  Rounding up to three persons for the 
obvious reasons, can the national transgender population of Vatican City be 
considered a “multiplicity?”  As another extreme example of this “popula-
tion predicament,” the smallest State in the world in terms of population is 
                                                
146. Akayesu ¶ 580.   
147. Multiplicity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY FREE ONLINE LEGAL DICTIONARY (2nd Ed.) 
http://thelawdictionary.org/multiplicity/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2014). 
148. Countries of the World, WORLD ATLAS, 
http://www.worldatlas.com/aatlas/populations/ctypopsl.htm. (last visited Sept. 21, 2014). 
149. Dr. Gates estimated the transgender population of the United States only, but his estimate 
seems accurate enough to use for all purposes in this section. 
31
Kritz: Global Transgender Population & the International Criminal Court
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
THE GLOBAL TRANSGENDER POPULATION AND THE ICC 2014 
32 YALE HUMAN RIGHTS & DEVELOPMENT L.J. [Vol. XVII 
Tuvalu, with a population of a mere 11,640 persons.150  Again using Dr. 
Gates’ 0.3% estimate, there should be 34.92 transgender Tuvaluans.  Round-
ing up to an even 35 transgender persons in Tuvalu, the question must be 
asked whether, if each and every of these thirty-five transgender persons 
suffered as victims of an Article 7 crime, would this number of victims con-
stitute a “multiplicity,” as thirty-five is not a particularly large number.  
What about Nauru’s estimated thirty-nine potential transgender victims?151  
This mathematical exercise could go on all the way up to China’s 
1,306,313,800 persons and potential transgender population of 3,918,941 
persons.152  At what gross number of transgender victims would the ICC 
determine the existence of a multiplicity?  If there is such a magic number 
where a multiplicity occurs, are we left to assume that the American, In-
dian, or Chinese transgender population is protected as a multiplicity be-
cause the population achieved this magic number when the Tuvaluan or 
Nauruan transgender population is not?  Using the international criminal 
law requirement of a multiplicity of victims, we run into this potential in-
consistency of unequal protection for national transgender populations 
based on no more than the size of the population of any given nation. This 
unequal protection should give us great pause on a number of levels, most 
pointedly as to the ability of international criminal law to protect the en-
tirety of the global transgender population from crimes against humanity. 
To further complicate the issue of proving a multiplicity in an Article 7 
attack on a transgender population, what happens if the entire transgender 
population of a State is not targeted, merely the transgender population of a 
region within a State, a region or sub-region, a town, or a village?  In this 
hypothetical, the number of potential transgender victims plummets as the 
area targeted for trans violence shrinks, making the existence of a multiplic-
ity of victims ever increasingly harder to prove.  
 
Can an Intersex Population Qualify as a Multiplicity? 
As you may recall, Blackless et. al. concluded that the frequency of in-
tersexuality might be as high as 2% (overall deviation from ideal 
male/female) or as low as between 0.1 to 0.2% (the percentage of those re-
ceiving corrective genital surgery).153 With this wide scope of prevalence 
firmly in mind, the determination of whether an intersex population quali-
fies as a multiplicity might hinge upon whether one uses a broad definition 
of intersexuality (the 2% figure) or a more narrow definition of the meaning 
of intersexuality (the 0.1% to 0.2%).  Using the 2% figure, it seems quite 
possible that the ICC would find 2% of the overall population that are 
deemed to be intersex to be a multiplicity (18.4 intersex persons out of the 
920 in Vatican City, 232.8 out of 11,640 in Tuvalu, 261 out of 13,050 in 
                                                
150. Countries of the World, supra note 148. 
151. Id. 
152. Blackless et al., supra note 64, at 151. 
153. Id.  
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Nauru, and so on).  However, if intersexuality is narrowed to those who re-
ceive corrective genital surgery, such a 0.1 to 0.2% of the population might 
very well not be considered a multiplicity.  
 
Can Trans Violence be Widespread, if Widespread Means Massive, 
Frequent or Large-Scale as per Akayesu? 
If the ICC chooses to follow the more stringent Akayesu test that wide-
spread means “massive, frequent, large-scale action, carried out collectively 
with considerable seriousness,” the potential outcome is even more likely to 
leave transgender populations on the outside of international criminal law, 
looking in.154 Certainly, it would be a challenge of both fact and law to 
prove that crimes against the small number of potential transgender victims 
in Vatican City (three), and Tuvalu (thirty-five) would constitute massive, 
frequent or large-scale action carried out collectively with considerable se-
riousness.  How about Palau, San Marino, Monaco, Lichtenstein, St. Kitts 
and Nevis, the Marshall Islands, and on up the line from the least to most 
populous of nations (always assuming their transgender population follows 
Dr. Gates’ 0.3% estimate)?  At what point would an attack on the entire 
transgender population of a State become massive enough, frequent 
enough, or large-scale enough to satisfy this requirement?  The answer is 
not clear, and let us hope, for the sake of transgender persons who would 
have to suffer significant victimhood in order to find such an answer, that 
we never find out where the ICC would decide to draw the line.  
 
Can an Attack on an Intersex Population be Widespread if Widespread 
Means Massive, Frequent, or Large Scale as per Akayesu? 
 
Out of fear of redundancy, it seems prudent to not reproduce the above 
discussion of what makes an attack widespread if widespread means mas-
sive, frequent or large scale as per Akayesu.  It seems sufficient to write that 
the question of whether an attack on an intersex population could qualify 
as massive, frequent or large scale would seem to hinge upon how the ICC 
would define the scope of intersexuality.  Recalling again our earlier dis-
cussion of the prevalence of intersexuality in How Sexually Dimorphic Are 
We?  Review and Synthesis, the authors concluded that the frequency of in-
tersexuality “might be as high as 2% of all live births” while the percentage 
of persons receiving “corrective genital surgery” probably “runs between 1 
and 2 per 1000 (0.1 to 0.2%).155  Using our earlier logic, it seems that target-
ing 0.1 to 0.2% of the overall population, assuming for a moment that tar-
geting each and every person who had received corrective genital surgery 
                                                
154. Akayesu ¶ 580. 
155. Blackless et al., supra note 64, at 151. 
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was even feasible (as such surgical details would surely be private details 
known only to the individual who received the surgery, close family and a 
small handful of medical professionals), might not qualify as massive, fre-
quent or large scale, especially in countries with smaller overall popula-
tions.  Using Blackless’s 2% estimate of overall deviation from standard 
male and female, establishing that an attack on 2% of the population quali-
fied as massive, frequent or large scale would certainly be easier to accom-
plish.  However, since intersexuality is biological/chromosomal/hormonal 
in nature, and often manifests itself around sexual anatomy that combines 
both male and female physical characteristics, it seems likely that these de-
viations from the norm will most often remain out of the public eye, mak-
ing many intersex persons unidentifiable and thereby not targetable by po-
tential malefactors, lowering the percentage of identifiable intersex persons 
below Blackless’s 2% estimate. 
As a summary to this section, it seems that the challenge of establishing 
that an attack on an intersex population is massive, frequent, or large scale 
in nature is akin to that of a transgender population.   Thus, while the chal-
lenge of proving that an attack on a transgender population is widespread 
would be great, the difficulty of establishing the same for an intersex popu-
lation would be similarly difficult.  Thus, it may also be difficult for an at-
tack on an intersex population to qualify as a crime against humanity. 
 
Can an Attack on a Transgender Population be Widespread if it 
Requires a Large Number of Victims as per Katanga? 
In a case of group violence against a transgender population, the ICC 
could very well choose to follow the ruling by the Katanga Chamber, requir-
ing a “large number of victims” in order to establish a crime against hu-
manity under Article 7.  An examination of whether an attack on a trans-
gender population could reach the threshold of a “large number of victims” 
seems significantly similar to whether such an attack would qualify as a 
multiplicity as required by Ayayesu, Ruzindana and Kayishema and Tadic.  To 
the extent that the application of the demographics and other particulars of 
a transgender population to the legal requirements set forth above are the 
same, they will not be repeated here.  However, some interesting legal 
questions, currently unanswered, arise while considering this question.  Is 
the requirement of a large number of victims effectively the same as the re-
quirement of a multiplicity of victims, or does the requirement of a large 
number of victims require more or fewer victims than would a multiplicity?  
Also, the question of unequal protection for the transgender population of 
small and large States again arises, in that it will be difficult to demonstrate 
that the transgender population of Vatican City, Tuvalu, or Nauru could 
qualify as “a large number,” even assuming, arguendo, that their entire 
numbers were victimized. 
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Can an Attack on an Intersex Population be Widespread, if Widespread 
Means a Large Number of Victims? 
After the above discussions, it seems cumulative to add more than a 
few sentences on whether an attack on an intersex population could qualify 
as having a large number of victims.  Again, intersexuality is a rare occur-
rence, affecting 0.1/0.2 to 2% of the population, depending on how broadly 
one defines intersexuality.  The challenges of proving a large number of vic-
tims in an attack on a transgender population are only magnified in an at-
tack on an intersex population if only the 0.1 to 0.2% who have had genital 
corrective surgery are targeted.  If everyone who deviates from the ideal 
male and female is targeted, certainly victimization in large numbers is 
more possible, assuming that all such potential victims are identifiable and, 
thereby, targetable. 
  
A Systematic Attack on Transgender or Intersex Civilians 
The requirement that an attack be “thoroughly organized” and “follow-
ing a regular pattern” on the basis of a “common policy” involving “sub-
stantial public or private resources” or the alternative Katanga test that an 
attack must be “either an organized plan in furtherance of a common pol-
icy, which follows a regular pattern and results in a continuous commission 
of acts or as ‘patterns of crimes’ such that the crimes constitute a non-
accidental repetition of similar criminal conduct on a regular basis” are 
more questions of the motives and planning of the perpetrators of trans vio-
lence than questions of the victims themselves. 156  Thus, it is difficult to dis-
cuss, with any specificity, a hypothetical case of a crime against humanity 
against a civilian transgender or intersex population and analyze its sys-
tematicness.  The most that can be said at this point is that criminal actions 
amounting to “random acts that were not committed as part of a broader 
plan or policy” would not qualify as systematic and would not be crimes 
against humanity.  However, at some point of organization, methodical 
planning or creation of a policy, a campaign of anti-transgender or intersex 
violence will transform from a series of mere hate crimes into an organized 
campaign constituting crimes against humanity.  At that point, the ICC 
would potentially have the mandate to get involved, but not before. 
 
VII.  PERSECUTION OF TRANSGENDER AND INTERSEX PERSONS 
Under Article 7(h), it is a crime against humanity to persecute any iden-
tifiable group or collectivity on a host of grounds including gender.157  
                                                
156. Prosecutor v. Katanga, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, Pre-Trial I, ICC-01/04-
01/07-717, 1 October 2008, ¶ 397.   
157. Rome Statute art. 7(h). 
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Thus, it would seem that persecuting transgender persons as a group or 
collectivity could be an Article 7 crime on these grounds.  However, the ne-
gotiations which created Article 7(h) and Article 7(3) reveal that the con-
templated definition of gender might actually exclude transgender and in-
tersex persons from protection under its auspices. 
While Article 7(h) clearly bans persecution based on gender, Article 7(3) 
states that “[f]or the purpose of this Statute, it is understood that the term 
‘gender’ refers to the two sexes, male and female, within the context of soci-
ety.  The term ‘gender’ does not indicate any meaning different from the 
above.”  Essentially, the wording of Article 7(3) was formed to assuage the 
fears and concerns of two disparate lobbying groups to the Rome Confer-
ence, women’s groups and The Catholic Church.  The reference to “the two 
sexes, male and female” was a concession to The Vatican, while the refer-
ence to gender “within the context of society” was a concession to women’s 
groups, who wanted to include as fluid a concept, and as many iterations, 
of the term gender as possible.  The fascinating interplay during these nego-
tiations, and the potential application and interpretation of these two por-
tions of the statute, could have a great effect on the global transgender and 
intersex populations and whether they can be protected under Article 7(h). 
Strict application of Article 7(h)’s reference to gender as meaning “male 
and female” might leave many transgender and intersex persons outside of 
the purview of protection of the statute.  This male/female dyad may in-
deed protect those transgender persons who identify as a member of the 
sex not assigned to them at birth (they are protected as a self-identified 
women, even though they were declared male at birth, or vice versa).   
However, this definition does not seem to include transgender people that, 
for example, identify as agender, do not have a gender identity, or refuse to 
be classified as male or female.  Nor would it protect those who have a 
combination of masculine and feminine characteristics, consider themselves 
“gender fluid” or move between genders, or have indistinct boundaries be-
tween their gender identity, gender expression and sexual orientation.  
Similarly, intersex persons may be considered outside the binary 
male/female dyad required by Article 7(3), and therefore are left unpro-
tected. 
Even the “legal concession” to women’s groups that gender refers to 
the two sexes, male and female, “within the context of society,” may not 
protect transgender persons.  Surely, it can be argued that in the United 
States, Canada and Western Europe transgender persons have become suf-
ficiently mainstreamed to become at least somewhat woven into the fabric 
of those societies.  In fact, as I write this sentence, Laverne Cox, a trans-
gender actress in the hit television series, Orange is the New Black, is on the 
cover of Time Magazine.158  However, has transgender life become main-
streamed in all countries throughout the globe?  Similarly, how about inter-
sex persons?  The answer seems a resounding “no.” If transgender and in-
                                                
158. Katy Steinmetz, Laverne Cox Talks to TIME About the Transgender Movement, TIME, May 29, 
2014, available at http://time.com/132769/transgender-orange-is-the-new-black-laverne-cox-
interview/. 
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tersex persons are, in dozens upon dozens of nations, killed, beaten, ostra-
cized, threatened, and harassed, can we really argue that their gender fits 
within the context of these societies?  If notions of transgender and intersex 
do not fit gender notions in these individual societies, it is hard to argue 
that transgender and intersex life fits within our combined global societal 
notions of male and female, thereby not fitting within our global “context of 
society.”  Thus, even with the designation that gender refers to male and 
female “within the context of society,” transgender and intersex persons 
may be left outside of what society, writ large, considers to be “male and 
female.” 
After all of the above, it seems safe to say that the negotiations that cre-
ated the Rome Statute were not progressive enough to acknowledge the flu-
idity of the gender spectrum, let alone that violence against transgender 
and intersex persons should be clearly punishable under crimes against 
humanity law.  Thus, it seems entirely possible that the ICC could not pro-
tect transgender and intersex persons from a targeted attack under the cur-
rent definitional strictures of Articles 7(h) and 7(3). 
 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
In 1946, The U.N. General Assembly eloquently stated in Declaration 96 
(I) that the crime of genocide “shocks the conscience of mankind, results in 
great losses to humanity . . . and is contrary to moral law and to the spirit 
and aims of the United Nations.”159  It further declared that the crime is 
punishable whether committed on religious, political or any other 
grounds.160  It would seem from that declaration that all groups—whether 
Jews, Tutsi, transgender persons or other—would be protected by a body of 
comprehensive mass atrocity treaty law in the near future.  However, this 
article demonstrates that such a broad understanding is unfortunately not 
today’s reality.  In fact, the developments in mass atrocity law, from this in-
clusive 1946 General Assembly Declaration, to the more limited 1948 Geno-
cide Convention, to the strictures of the ad hoc tribunals, seem to demon-
strate ever-increasing exclusion.161   
With the creation of the ICC, the States Parties to the Rome Statute had 
the opportunity for a new era of protection for all groups. “Conscious that 
all peoples are united by common bonds, their cultures pieced together in a 
shared heritage, and concerned that this delicate mosaic may be shattered 
at any time,” the ICC vowed to prevent and punish perpetrators of mass 
atrocity, and to protect “men, women, and children” from the horrors that 
occurred in the twentieth century.162  
Whether intentional or unintentional, their choice of the words “men, 
women and children” are emblematic of the exclusivity with which the 
                                                
159. The Crime of Genocide, G.A. Res. 96 (I), supra note 65. 
160. Id. 
161. With the notable exception of Akayesu. 
162. Rome Statute Preamble (emphasis omitted). 
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Rome Statute offers protection from genocide and crimes against humanity.  
From the analysis set forth in this article, it is clear that the global trans-
gender and intersex communities may not be protected from genocide and 
crimes against humanity under Articles 6 and 7 of the Rome Statute.  This 
potential lack of protection for a group of people who, in many countries, 
are routinely beaten, murdered, tortured, and persecuted is a violation of 
the spirit of equality before the law, not to mention a violation of the basic 
human rights of the global transgender and intersex populations.  
Without equality on the international criminal legal landscape, we as an 
international legal society cannot claim to truly have “common bonds” or a 
“shared heritage” that accepts and includes our differences as human be-
ings. Without the full inclusion of transgender and intersex persons in the 
ambit of the Rome Statute, our “delicate mosaic” of common bonds and 
shared heritage will be shattered, if it ever truly existed.163 
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